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A VIRTUE-CENTERED APPROACH TO THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMONS (OR, THE 
VIRTUOUS PENGUIN) 
David W. Opderbeck • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property protection is the key factor for economic growth and 
advancement in the biotechnology sector. Patents add value to laboratory discoveries 
and in doing so provide incentives for private sector investment into biotechnology 
development. The Biotechnology Industry Organization advocates a strong and 
effective global intellectual property system. 1 
-Biotechnology Industry Organization 
The explosion of patenting rather than delivery as a metric for investment in 
biological sciences, while hinting at great opportunities in the accelerating pace of 
discovery, has created a thicket of rights, self-reinforcing barriers, and added costs of 
impediments to innovation. 2 
---Cambia BiOS Initiative 
These apparently radically different views about biotechnology intellectual 
property policy seem to represent a deep division about whether patents and other 
Intellectual Property Rights (IP Rs) encourage or discourage innovation. This division, 
however, is in many ways superficial. Although these statements reach very different 
conclusions, both are based on common utilitarian philosophical and ethical 
assumptions about IPRs. In particular, both assume that IPRs are fundamentally 
merely economic tools or instruments that can be evaluated primarily through 
empirical arguments about the correlation between strong IPRs and rates ofinnovation. 
Though the empirical conclusions of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) 
and Cambia represent a fissure between different approaches to IPR policy in 
biotechnology research, that fissure penetrates only the crust of a larger utilitarian and 
instrumentalist structure. 
The instrumentalist emphasis of the current biotechnology IPR debate is not 
surprising. In the American tradition, intellectual property law has long been justified 
primarily by instrumentalist concerns. Thomas Jefferson famously acceded to the 
"embarrassment" of patent and copyright monopolies because he believed a limited 
• Assistant Professor, Law Department, Baruch College, City University of New York. The author 
wishes to thank the participants in the Closing in on Open Science Symposium at the University of Maine 
School of Law and the World and Christian Imagination Conference at Baylor University for their helpful 
comments. Thanks also to Brad Kallenberg of the University of Dayton and Yann Joly of the Genetics and 
Society Project and McGill University for their insights. All errors are my own. 
I. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Intellectual Property, http://www.bio.org/ip/ (last visited Jan. 
26, 2007). 
2. Cambia BiOS Initiative, The Cambia BiOS Initiative; Implementation Phase 3 (Jan. 31, 2006), 
http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/2029/version/l/part/4/data/. 
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monopoly would encourage the production of new scholarship and inventions. 3 The 
framers' willingness to allow this embarrassment for the greater good is enshrined in 
the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 4 Countless judicial opinions 
refer to intellectual property law as a tool that provides necessary incentives to creators 
and innovators. 5 Intellectual property policy directed at biomedical research is 
expressly instrumentalist. For example, the Bayh-Dole Act,6 which permitted the 
patenting ofinventions developed through government-funded research, was "designed 
to ... encourage private industry to utilize Government financed inventions through 
the commitment of the risk capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point 
of commercial application. "7 
The American instrumentalist approach to intellectual property in part reflects 
John Locke's influence on the American founders. A substantial body of recent 
scholarship has explored the Lockean justification for intellectual property. 8 As Justin 
Hughes has noted, American intellectual property jurisprudence is largely rooted in 
Locke's labor theory.9 One strand of that theory holds that labor is inherently 
unpleasant, such that property rights in the fruits of the laborer's efforts are required 
as an incentive for the laborer to engage in the unpleasant activity. 10 This instrumental 
claim about labor as incentive has a utilitarian foundation, because labor is necessary 
to promote the public good. 11 A second strand of Lockean labor theory is the 
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 18 I 3), available at 
http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/mcphersonletter.html. 
4. The Constitution gives Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 303-04 (1988) ("Even the Constitution's copyright and patent clause is cast 
in instrumental terms."). 
5. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) ("The patent laws promote [the 
progress of science and the useful arts] by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an 
incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts."); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 
480-81 (1974) ("The patent laws promote [the progress of science and the useful arts] by offering a right 
of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of 
time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the 
emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens."). 
6. Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 200-211, 94 stat. 3015, 3019-29 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 200-212). 
7. H.R. Rep. 109-409, at 2 (2006) (quoting H.R. Rep. 96-1307(1), at 3 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6462). An April, 2006 House Report concerning the Bayh-Dole Act recites the Act's 
alleged successes in similarly instrumentalist terms: the Act, it states, "has helped to catalyze a quarter 
century of enhanced research and development within the United States and led to dramatic improvements 
in public health and safety, a strengthened and better resourced higher education system in the U.S., and 
the development of new domestic industries that have created tens of thousands of highly skilled jobs for 
American citizens." Id. at 3. 
8. See, e.g., Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179 (2003); Wendy Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking 
Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004); Hughes, supra note 4; Lior Zemer, The Making ofa 
New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 891 (2006). 
9. Hughes, supra note 4, at 300-05. 
10. Id. at 303. 
11. Id. Some scholars distinguish Locke's natural law arguments from utilitarian justifications for 
intellectual property. See Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & Pue. AFFS. 31 
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proposition that when labor is applied to nature, the value added by the laborer merits 
a reward. 12 Although the value-added theory is a normative proposition, it is 
understood in an instrumentalist or consequentialist sense to mean that laborers will 
only add value to nature if they expect to receive equal value in return from society. 13 
The Lockean instrumental argument, Justin Hughes notes, "clearly has dominated 
official pronouncements on American copyrights and patents." 14 
The instrumentalist approach to intellectual property has nearly fully occupied the 
international sphere. The Trade Related Aspects oflntellectual Property agreement 
(TRIPS), in particular, reflects the view that the "social purpose" of intellectual 
property "is to provide protection for the results of investment in the development of 
new technology, thus giving the incentive and means to finance research and 
development activities." 15 
Much of the legal and economic scholarship relating to IPR policy and the 
biotechnology commons explores this instrumentalist approach. Michael Heller and 
Rebecca Eisenberg's enormously influential article concerning the biomedical research 
anticommons was framed in terms of deterrence and incentives to innovation. 16 The 
debate over the biotechnology anticommons has been framed in terms of whether 
"exclusive rights in new knowledge will promote scientific progress," or whether 
"science advances most rapidly when the community enjoys free access to new 
discoveries." 17 The U.S. Constitution, Rebecca Eisenberg notes in one ofher germinal 
articles on how patents affect scientific progress, "posits an instrumental justification 
for patents, allowing Congress to enact patent legislation for the specific purpose of 
promoting scientific progress." 18 Similarly, scholars such as Mark Lemley and Dan 
Burk have explored whether tweaking the patent system in various ways would 
increase incentives to innovate and to develop commercial products in fields such as 
biotechnology and traditional pharmaceuticals. 19 
( 1989). Hettinger distinguishes Locke's focus on just desert and natural entitlement to the fruits of one's 
labor from incentive based utilitarian theories. Id. at 40-51. While it is true that Locke's approach to 
property offers different moral justifications than Iaterutilitarian theories, Locke is properly viewed in many 
respects as a forerunner of later utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham. See, e.g., MA TI HA YRY, LIBERAL 
UTILITARIANISM AND APPLIED ETHICS 4 ( 1994 ). 
12. Hughes, supra note 4, at 305. 
13. Id. at 305-06. 
I 4. Id. at 303. 
IS. World Trade Organization website, What are Intellectual Property Rights, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intell_e.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2007). A second 
instrumental pmpose ofIPRs, according to the WTO, is to "facilitate the transfer of technology in the form 
of foreign direct investment, joint ventures and licensing." Id. 
16. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (I 998). Heller and Eisenberg argued that "(p ]olicy-makers should 
seek to ensure coherent boundaries of upstream patents and to minimize restrictive licensing practices that 
interfere with downstream product development. Otherwise, more upstream rights may lead paradoxically 
to fewer useful products for improving human health." Id. at 70 I. 
17. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1989). 
18. Id. at 1024. 
19. Dan L. Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). 
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Some scholars have begun to examine and critique the Lockean instrumentalist 
basis of intellectual property law more broadly and carefully. Peter Drahos, for 
example, takes a Rawlsian approach and argues that parties in the original position 
would seek to minimize proprietary control over information. 20 Drahos views 
information as a primary good because of information's central role in human 
planning. 21 Because information is a primary good that is essential to liberty, it should 
be distributed equally, unless unequal distribution is necessary to benefit the least 
advantaged members of society. 22 This drives Drahos to an instrumentalist view of 
information (and property generally), but it is a different instrumentalism than 
Locke's. 23 
For Drahos, an "instrumentalist" view of the law of information means that "law 
is a tool," which is employed to ensure that the Rawlsian social contract concerning 
access to information is kept. 24 Drahos thus writes from a legal realist perspective. 25 
For Drahos, "[a]n instrumentalism of property does not commit its holder to any 
specific moral theory or values." 26 Thus, Drahos eschews economic instrumentalism 
based on Locke, but like many Lockeans, considers proprietary rights in information 
( or, as Drahos prefers, proprietary "privileges") only in the context of the specific 
incentives and externalities such rights might entail. 27 
In contrast to these instrumentalist approaches, other theorists have developed the 
Hegelian theme that property "provides a unique or especially suitable mechanism for 
self-actualization, for personal expression, and for dignity and recognition as an 
individual person." 28 In this view, private property is necessary because "to achieve 
proper self-development-to be a person-an individual needs some control over 
resources in the external environment." 29 As applied to intellectual property, this 
notion can take on particular force, because creative expression is an element of one's 
self. 30 Thus, although an author may alienate copies of her work, she "keeps the 
20. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 171-93 (1996). 
21. Id. at 173-75. 
22. Id. at 176-81. 
23. Id. at 199-224. 
24. Id. at 213-219. 
25. See id. at 213 (stating that "[w]hen used in connection with law, instrumentalism refers to the idea 
that law is a tool"); id. at 213 n.53 (referring in the footnote to the "links" between instrumentalism and 
"pragmatism and American Legal Realism"). 
26. Id. at 214. 
27. See, e.g., id. at 215. Drahos discusses how, under his proposal, economists would have to consider 
"distributive" theories as well as Pareto efficiency in assessing rules about exclusive rights or privileges in 
information. Id. 
28. Hughes, supra note 4, at 330. 
29. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,957 (1982). 
30. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 338. See also Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A 
Common-Law Basis for the Protection of Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. l (1988); Neil Netanel, 
Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental 
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. l (1994); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, I 00 
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1879-87 (I 987); Radin, supra note 29. This reading of Hegel recently has been 
criticized by Jeanne Schroeder, who contends that, while Hegelian personality theory requires minimal 
protections for private property, it does not require protection for any specific type of property, including 
intellectual property. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property, 60 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 453 (2006). 
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universal aspect of expression" as her own. 31 Alienation of the personal aspect of 
expression would be tantamount to slavery. 32 
Still others have mounted a postmodern critique of the notion of"authorship" that 
underlies copyrights and patents. These critics argue that intellectual property rules 
are based on the fiction that an identifiable "author" or "inventor" is responsible for 
a given creative work or invention and the related fiction that such "authors" or 
"inventors" can "own" information. "Authorship" or "inventorship," in this reading, 
is properly considered a communal practice, rather than an individual achievement. 
It is improper, then, to grant any individual monopoly control over what should remain 
accessible to the entire community. 33 William Fisher has characterized this as a "social 
planning theory" of intellectual property. 34 
Each of these approaches has merit. The instrumentalist justification has facilitat-
ed the rise of technology-rich industries, such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, 
and the postmodern critique appropriately focuses attention on the communal nature 
of creative and inventive work. But none of them seems complete in itself, and it can 
be difficult to draw connections between them. Moreover, none of these approaches 
situates intellectual property into a coherent broader context of human development 
and flourishing. As a result, the academic debate over intellectual property remains at 
a stalemate, while in the political arena the utilitarian view prevails because wealthy 
and powerful corporate interests support it. 
We should be able to move past this stalemate. Indeed, there is an ancient 
understanding of ethics that could integrate the useful themes inherent in existing 
theories and provide a more robust and humane treatment of intellectual property in 
society: that of virtue ethics. Legal scholars have just begun to explore the implica-
tions of virtue ethics for law and policy and to develop a system of"virtue jurispru-
dence. "35 As leading virtue jurisprudence scholar Lawrence Solum describes it, virtue 
jurisprudence is in one sense a new theory, as it draws on the recent explosion of 
interest in virtue ethics generally. 36 But, Solum notes, virtue jurisprudence "is also a 
very old theory, rooted in Aristotle's conception of ethics, politics, and the nature of 
law."37 
31. Hughes, supra note 4, at 338. 
32. Id. 
33. See, e.g., THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TExTUALAPPROPRIATIONINLAW AND LITERATURE 
(Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, eds., 1994); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: 
Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & Arts 1 (1994); James Boyle, 
A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 
1415 (1992); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property 
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); The Society for Critical Exchange, The 
Bellagio Declaration, (Mar. 1 I, 1993), available at http://www.case.edu/affil/sce/BellagioDec.htmI.; 
Society for Critical Exchange, Intellectual Property and the Construction of Authorship, http://www.case. 
edu/affil/sce/IPCA _ main.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
34. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY OF PROPERTY (2001). 
35. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging, 34 META-
PHILOSOPHY 178 (2003). 
36. Id. at 179. 
37. Id. 
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This essay is an effort to contribute to this new-but-ancient field of virtue 
jurisprudence by sketching out some ways in which a virtue ethics approach could 
relate to the debates over open source biotechnology. In the next section, I will briefly 
summarize the core themes of contemporary virtue ethics. I will then identify how 
those themes could relate to the problem of open source biotechnology. 
II. WHAT IS VIRTUE ETHICS? 
A. Summary of Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics focus on a person's virtues or character more than on the person's 
individual decisions. 38 The central question for virtue ethics is not so much "did I 
make the right decision in this situation" as "have I acquired the characteristics of a 
virtuous person." In this way, virtue ethics is different than deontological ethics, which 
emphasize adherence to particular ethical rules or precepts, and utilitarian or 
consequentialist ethics, which examine the consequences of an action to determine 
whether it, on balance, benefits the public welfare. In virtue ethics, particular actions 
are examined in relation to how they reflect and inculcate virtue rather than in relation 
to whether they fall within a rule or maximize welfare. 39 
The concept of virtue as the focus of ethics can be traced back to ancient Greek 
thought. Plato enumerated the four "cardinal" virtues of fortitude, temperance, justice 
and wisdom. 40 It was Aristotle, however, who developed the virtues into a practical 
ethical system. 41 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle developed the concept of 
eudemonia, or "human flourishing," as the touchstone of ethics. 42 Eudemonia is 
38. For a good overview of virtue ethics, see Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2006 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue. 
39. Although this is a useful broad brush description of virtue ethics and its differences from 
consequentialist and deontological positions, a more detailed account of virtue ethics, which is beyond the 
scope of this essay, would recognize that there are similarities as well as more subtle differences among the 
three positions. See Rosalind Hursthouse, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 25-42 (Oxford University Press 1999). 
40. EDMUND 0. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MEDICAL PRACTICE 4 (1993). 
41. /d.at4-5. 
42. In the introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states: 
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake ( everything 
else being desired for the sake of this), and ifwe do not choose everything for the sake of 
something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would 
be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the 
knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a 
mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at 
least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It 
would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master 
art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences 
should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what 
point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall 
under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the 
sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain 
from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the 
good for man. 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Bk. I, ch. 2, http://classics.mit.edu/ Aristotle/nicomachaen.html {last 
visited Jan. 28, 2007). Later in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes eudemonia (translated here 
as "happiness," but better translated "flourishing") as follows: 
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achieved when human beings live according to their fullest human potential. The focus 
of ethical reflection, then, is to encourage the development of character traits, or 
"virtues," that enable people to achieve their fullest potential. For Artistotle, there 
were "intellectual" virtues of art, science, intuition, reasoning, and practical wisdom, 
and the "moral" virtues, which include Plato's four cardinal virtues as well as 
characteristics like magnanimity. 43 
Aristotelian virtue ethics were incorporated into Western thought by Aquinas in 
connection with natural law theory, as part of the "Aristotelian synthesis.''44 Aquinas 
recognized the classical virtues, but accorded special status to phronesis, or "practical 
reason," and added the "spiritual" virtues of faith, hope, and charity. 45 
Interest in virtue ethics waned along with the decline of natural law theory during 
and following the Enlightenment. 46 Ethical theory largely focused instead on 
consequentialist or deontological models. 47 Starting with Elizabeth Anscombe's 
pioneering work, however, ethicists such as Anscombe and Philippa Foot reopened the 
notion of virtue as central to ethical theory.48 In 1984, the publication of Alisdair 
Macintyre's After Virtue reignited interest in virtue ethics on a broader scale. 
In Maclntyre's view, the "Enlightenment Project" of justifying ethics without 
regard to virtue failed because it lacked any meaningful notion of teleology.49 
MacIntyre describes ethics as that which seeks to bridge the gap between man-as-he-is 
Now that we have spoken of the virtues, the forms of friendship, and the varieties of 
pleasure, what remains is to discuss in outline the nature of happiness, since this is what we 
state the end of human nature to be. Our discussion will be the more concise ifwe first sum 
up what we have said already. We said, then, that it is not a disposition; for if it were it 
might belong to some one who was asleep throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or, 
again, to some one who was suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these implications are 
unacceptable, and we must rather class happiness as an activity, as we have said before, and 
if some activities are necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else, while others 
are so in themselves, evidently happiness must be placed among those desirable in 
themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness does not 
lack anything, but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from 
which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature virtuous actions are thought 
to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake. 
Id. at Bk. I 0, ch. 6. For Maclntyre's application of the concept of eudemonia to contemporary virtue ethics, 
see ALAsDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 148-50 (2d. ed., U. of Notre Dame Press 1984) (1981). 
43. ARISTOTLE, supra note 42, at Bk. 6, ch. I; PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 40, at 5. 
44. See PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 40, at 7-8. 
45. Id. at 8. For Aquinas's discussion of the virtues, see THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, 
q. 55-67 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros. 1974). 
46. See PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY I (Univ. of 
Cal. Press 1978) ("For many years the subject of the virtues and vices was strangely neglected by moralists 
working within the school of analytic philosophy."). 
47. See id. (noting that the neglect of virtue in ethical theory "was apparently shared by philosophers 
such as Hume, Kant, Mill, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and H. A. Prichard, from whom contemporary moral 
philosophy has mostly been derived"). 
48. See id.; G.E.M. Anscombe, Modem Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 124 (1958). For a 
discussion of the recent resurgence of virtue ethics, see ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 2-3 
(1999); see also Nafsika Athanassoulis, Virtue Ethics, in INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://www.iep.utrn.edu/v/virtue.htm (last visited Feb. I, 2007). 
49. MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 51-61. 
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and man-as-he-ought-to-be. 50 MacIntyre notes that ''the joint effect of the secular 
rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical 
rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-
realized-his-te/os."51 Absent such a notion of teleology, moral judgments become 
something less than "factual statements." 52 
Utilitarian ethics attempted to bridge this gap by proposing that ethical judgments 
are objective statements about individual preferences-or utility and the summation 
of such preferences-to achieve happiness for the greatest possible number of people. 53 
However, MacIntyre notes, it soon became clear that "the notion of human happiness 
is not a unitary, simple notion and cannot provide us with a criterion for making our 
key choices. "54 Thus, ethics began a decline into mere emotivism, in which ethical 
statements are nothing more than personal expressions of subjective preferences. As 
MacIntyre puts it, "[t]he history ofutilitarianism thus links historically the eighteenth-
century project of justifying morality and the twentieth century's decline into 
emotivism." 55 Virtue theory, then, represents an effort to ground ethical reflection in 
deeper soil than consequentialist or utilitarian theories allow. 
B. The Core Axes of Community, Practices, Tradition, and Teleology 
There are four core axes around which virtue ethics turns: community, practices, 
tradition, and teleology. I will summarize each of these axes below, and then will 
suggest some ways in which they are particularly relevant to biotechnology intellectual 
property policy. 
1. Community 
Virtue ethics are communitarian. The development of individual virtue occurs 
only within the context of a particular community. The community shapes and defines 
the "virtues" that are important to the community. The goal of human flourishing is 
achieved only as a community embodies the virtues. 
In Aristotelian thought, the notion of "excellence" is important to the 
communitarian context in which the virtues are developed and practiced. An analogy 
can be drawn here to a useful object, such as a hammer. We can ask, ''what 
characteristics should this object embody in order to function as an excellent hammer?" 
We might then identify characteristics including the tool's size, weight, balance, and 
striking surface. 
Tied to this concept of community is the notion of life as a "narrative." 56 
Narratives reflect the historical arc or telos of a community. MacIntyre places the 
virtues extolled by Aristotle within the narrative framework of the heroic Greek city-
50. Id. at 54-55. 
51. Id. at 54. 
52. Id. at 59. 
53. Id. at 62-64. 
54. Id. at 63. 
55. Id. at 65. 
56. See Brad J. Kallenberg, The Master Argument of MacIntyre 's After Virtue, in VIRTUES AND 
PRACTICES IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION 22 (2003). 
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state. 57 The virtues that were prominent in Aristotle and later Greek thought were those 
that were necessary to promote the flourishing of the ideal polis. 
2. Practices 
A second axis of virtue ethics is that of practices. Virtue ethics does not abjure 
rules or practices, but the focus is on practices rather than deontological rules. 58 The 
goal is to identify practices that will enable a community to embody its core virtues. 
As MacIntyre defines it, a "practice" is: 
[A]ny coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended. 59 
This definition means that practices entail goods internal to the activity. 60 Such 
"internal" goods are rewards recognized by practitioners. 61 In addition, practices 
include "standards of excellence" that, when achieved, give rise to the goods internal 
to the practice. 62 Finally, practices are "systematically extended," meaning that the 
practices' standards of excellence, as well as the capabilities of practitioners, rise over 
time.63 
3. Tradition 
A third axis of virtue ethics is that of "tradition." MacIntyre conceives of 
''tradition" as "an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument 
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition." 64 By "historically 
extended," MacIntyre means that the tradition of a community is a narrative, comprised 
57. MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 131-45. 
58. Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma have described the relationship between virtue and 
principles as follows: 
The virtuous person is virtuous with respect to this principle [that humans qua humans are 
owed respect for their ability to make reasoned choices that are their own and that others 
may not share] not simply because she observes the principle, but because she has not 
initialized it, made it synonymous with her intentions with respect to other humans, is 
habitually disposed to respect that principle, and is disposed to do so excellently-that is, 
as fully as possible. Thus, the virtuous person is not virtuous because she respects the 
principle, but because she recognizes the fundamental and universal nature of this principle, 
sees it not just as a duty in the Kantian sense, but as part of her character-incised, so to 
speak, in the etymological sense of the word "character," into her very person and identity. 
The virtuous person cultivates arete in the way she actualizes the virtue in her moral choices 
and actions. 
PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 40, at 22. 
59. MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 187. 
60. See Kallenberg, supra note 56, at 21. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 222; see also Kallenberg, supra note 56, at 24-26. 
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of the individual narratives of its members over time. 65 Thus, a community has its own 
historical arc and telos. Moreover, traditions are "socially embodied" because they are 
located in communities. 66 Individuals within communities pledge allegiance to the text 
or voice that provides authoritative structure to the community. 67 Yet, the community's 
narrative is not stagnant because new generations of community members continually 
reinterpret the tradition and apply it to contemporary circumstances. 68 In this way, over 
time, a living tradition represents a broad narrative that has weathered various 
challenges and crises. 69 
4. Teleology 
A final aspect of virtue ethics that is particularly suitable to the analysis of open 
source biotechnology is that of teleology. In a sense, teleology is not really a separate 
axis of virtue ethics, but rather is inherent in the axes of community, practices, and 
tradition already discussed. In fact, virtue ethics can be broadly considered as a form 
of teleological ethics, in that ethics is a process that moves the community towards the 
goal of human flourishing. 
Although virtue ethics is teleological, it should not be equated with 
consequentialism generally, or utilitarianism in particular. Indeed, one of the 
motivations for focusing on virtue ethics and biotechnology innovation policy is to 
move the discussion out of its utilitarian rut. 
It can of course be useful to attend to power relationships, utility preferences, and 
consequences of individual utility maximization when analyzing the legal regulation 
of biotechnology innovation. In fact, in a virtue ethics context, such considerations 
must be attended to given the importance of phronesis (practical wisdom) as a virtue. 
The problem, however, is that utilitarian approaches have dominated the legal 
scholarship, without a broader conception of why we should be concerned, as an 
ethical matter, about the deadweight losses caused by biotechnology patents or the 
effects ofa putative patent-induced anti commons. As MacIntyre notes, there is nothing 
connecting the humans-as-we-are with the humans-as-we-should-be. 70 Moreover, as 
MacIntyre and many other critics of consequentialist ethics also note, it is impossible 
to simplify even one person's utility to a basic function, much less to do so in complex 
political and cultural settings in which competing utilities seem incommensurable. 71 
65. Kallenberg, supra note 56, at 25. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 12 (1988). As MacIntyre puts 
it, a tradition is 
an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined 
and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to 
the tradition ... and those internal, interpretive debates through which the meaning and 
rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a 
tradition is constituted. 
Id. at 12; see also Kallenberg, supra note 56, at 25. 
70. See MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 63-65. 
71. Id. For a general summary ofobjections problems relating to the use ofindividual welfare functions 
for collective choice, see Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITAR1ANISM: FOR & 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 326 2007
326 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2 
In contrast, the teleology of human flourishing inherent in virtue ethics is a fully-
orbed concept. It includes utility maximization functions, but is more than the sum of 
such functions. This is because virtue ethics starts with a broad conception of ''the 
good" and then works backwards to the individual virtues that will support practices 
within communities progressing towards the good. The hope is to develop narratives, 
practices, examples, frameworks, and contexts that foster the internal development of 
virtue, rather than merely enforcing external rules that discipline preferences. 
In this regard, virtue ethics also should be distinguished from ethical systems that 
are primarily deontological. Deontological ethics emphasize adherence to duty.72 
Within liberal democratic states, the sort of social contract theory attributed to John 
Rawls can be viewed as a type of deontological ethic that emphasizes adherence to 
contract-like duties.73 In Rawls's view, the preferences of different social groups are 
incommensurable, such that society only coheres through a shared commitment to a 
small number of basic rules that comprise the social contract. Most of these rules 
relate to the scope of individual rights. Virtue ethics, in contrast, is unwilling to give 
up on a broader notion of community. 
III. How CAN VIRTUE ETHICS BE APPLIED TO BIOTECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY POLICY? (THE VIRTUOUS PENGUIN) 74 
There presently exists no framework for how virtue ethics could apply to 
intellectual property. The core virtue ethics axes of community, practices, tradition, 
and teleology, however, seem conducive to current discussions surrounding 
biotechnology. In the following sub-sections, I discuss how virtue ethics can relate 
broadly to open source methods of production, and then develop some themes in 
environmental and health care virtue ethics that can be applied to open source 
biotechnology. 
A. Virtue Ethics and Open Source Production Generally 
The virtue ethics notions of community and practices seem to map well onto the 
open source space. As Y ochai Benkler has noted, open source communities require 
AGAINST 77, 135-50 (1973); AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970). See 
also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-24 (1971) (critiquing classical utilitarianism as overly 
individualistic). 
72. The foremost proponent of this sort of ethical system was Immanuel Kant, who introduced the 
concept of the "categorical imperative": "I ought never to act except in such a way that I should also will 
that my maxim should become a universal law." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS 
OF MORALS 15 (Mary Gregor ed., 1998). For Maclntyre's discussion of Kant's deontological system, see 
MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 45-4 7. For a general discussion of deontological ethics, see Gerald F. Gaus, 
What is Deonto/ogy? Part One: Orthodox Views, 35 J. VALUE INQUIRY 27 (2001). 
73. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (200 l ). For Maclntyre's discussion of Rawls, see MACINTYRE, supra note 42, 
at 246-51. For further discussion of contemporary deontological views, see Gaus, supra note 72; Gerald 
F. Gaus, What is Deontology? Part Two: Reasons/or Action, 35 J. VALUE INQUIRY 179 (2001). 
74. The "penguin" refers to the penguin character that serves as a trademark for the Linux operating 
system. See Linux Online, http://www.linux.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). It also refers to Yochai 
Benkler's seminal article, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 
(2003). 
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a system of "social-psychological" rewards in order to flourish. 75 Such rewards can 
include the sort of"intemal goods" found in Maclntyrian "practices." 76 For example, 
a coder working on an open source software project might participate, at least in part, 
for the joy and satisfaction inherent in creating an elegant solution to a technical 
problem. 77 In addition, mature open source projects do not proceed aimlessly, but 
include standards of excellence established by the community and usually canonized 
by an influential individual or small group of individuals. 78 Finally, a pillar of open 
source production is the systematic extension of the project through the continuous 
feedback provided by numerous distributed workers. 79 
A tension might arise, however, between Maclntyre's emphasis on a community's 
authoritative text or voice and the notion of open source production as an enterprise 
comprised of essentially self-actualizing individuals. In fact, Y ochai Benkler and 
Helen Nissenbaum emphasize the virtue of "autonomy" as a core aspect of a virtue 
ethics approach to commons-based peer production. 80 Benkler in particular 
emphasizes the ways in which open source peer production contributes to justice by 
allowing space for individual autonomy.81 
But open source communities should not be conceived of as fractiously 
individualistic. A successful, long term open source community requires an 
authoritative voice or voices that regulate exchange, lend status to social-psychological 
rewards, and canonize valuable contributions to the project. 82 Open source production 
can indeed sometimes provide more space for individual creativity and expression than 
traditional hierarchical production, but such creativity and expression should be 
conceived in terms of virtues that lend themselves to communal practices, with such 
practices embedded in the narrative tradition of the community. 
Once open source communities are conceived in Maclntyrian terms, it is possible 
to identify virtues that support the flourishing of such communities. Benkler and 
Nissenbaum identify three "clusters" of virtues that relate to peer production: (1) 
"autonomy, independence, liberation"; 83 (2) "creativity, productivity, industry"; 84 (3) 
"benevolence, charity, generosity, altruism"; 85 and "sociability, camaraderie, 
friendship, cooperation, civic virtue." 86 
75. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 92-99 (2006). 
76. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
77. Some discernment is required here, however, as other types of social-psychological rewards, such 
as receiving praise and enhancing one's reputation, are not properly considered "internal goods." See 
Kallenberg, supra note 56, at 21. 
78. See David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 192-95 (2004). 
79. See BENKLER, supra note 75, at 66-68 (describing how open source networks operate). 
80. Yochai Benkler & Helen Nissenbaum, Commons-Based Peer Production and Virtue, 14 J. POL. 
PHIL. 394, 405-06 (2006). 
81. See BENKLER, supra note 75, at 8-9. 
82. Opderbeck, supra note 78, at 192-94. 
83. Benkler & Nissenbaum, supra note 80, at 405. 
84. Id. at 406. 
85. Id. at 407. 
86. Id. at 408. 
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The first cluster seems difficult to relate to the communitarian axis of virtue ethics. 
As an example of the "virtue" of autonomy, Benkler and Nissenbaum propose 
"independence from the wide-ranging commercial entities influencing our actions and 
choices as well as from the typical array of institutional entities, whether employers, 
banks, agents of government, or whoever." 87 In his important book The Wealth of 
Networks, Benkler stresses autonomy as a fundamental value promoted by open source 
production, but not from a virtue ethics framework. 88 In The Wealth of Networks, 
Benkler seems to approach the question of autonomy from a Kantian perspective. 89 
"Autonomy" seems better suited to the Kantian perspective Benkler takes in The 
Wealth of Networks than to the virtue ethics approach he takes with Nissenbaum. It 
may be true that commons-based production increases individual autonomy by 
providing alternatives to information flows produced by traditional commercial 
providers. But individual autonomy should not be conceived as a "virtue." Rather, 
some notion of autonomy may be a component of the eudemonia toward which the 
virtues direct human practices. And the virtues, as instantiated in practices and 
traditions, are never merely self-directed. Practices and traditions are by definition 
communal, not merely individual. 
A better approach to the question of autonomy within a virtue ethics framework 
of open source production would be to focus on the virtue of "respect" for the 
autonomy of others. If human flourishing requires that people have some capacity to 
make autonomous choices, then respecting the choices of others, and fostering 
communities in which such choices can be exercised, is an important virtue. 90 Viewed 
this way, it is possible to identify practices and traditions that embody this virtue. 
87. Id. at 406. 
88. See generally, BENKLER, supra note 75. Immanuel Kant argued, in contrast to utilitarian ethics, 
that human beings are ends in themselves and possess certain basic rights that cannot be subject to a merely 
utilitarian calculus. See KANT, supra note 72; see also Marc J. Roberts & Michael R. Reich, Ethical 
Analysis in Public Health, 359 LANCET 1055, 1056 (2002). Benkler features the Kantian notion ofan 
individual's "life plan" in his discussion of how open source production fosters individual autonomy. See, 
e.g., BENKLER, supra note 75, at 141-42 ("As a means of diagnosing the conditions of individual freedom 
in a given society and context, we must seek to observe the extent to which people are, in fact, able to plan 
and pursue a life that can reasonably be described as a product of their own choices .... It is in this sense 
that the increased range of actions we can imagine for ourselves in loose affiliation with others ... increases 
our ability to imagine and pursue life plans that would have been impossible in the recent past."). 
89. See BENKLER, supra note 75, at 133-175. Benkler argues that "(t]he structure of our information 
environment is constitutive of our autonomy, not only functionally significant to it." Id. at 147. Open 
source production enhances autonomy because it alters the power structure of the information environment 
and devolves more control to the individual. See, e.g., id. at 161 ("By offering alternative transactional 
frameworks for alternative information flows, these [ commons-based/open source] networks substantially 
and qualitatively increase the freedom of individuals to perceive the world through their own eyes, and to 
form their own perceptions of what options are open to them and how they might evaluate alternative 
courses of action."). 
90. There is, of course, significant room for discussion about the nature, extent, and role of individual 
autonomy in a flourishing community. It is difficult to conceive of a virtue ethic with a primarily 
individualistic teleology. Indeed, one of the attractions of virtue ethics is its rejection of the excessive 
individualism associated with the Enlightenment approach to morality. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 
42, at 51-61 ("Why the Enlightenment Project of Justifying Morality Had to Fail"). 
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Benkler and Nissenbaum's focus on "creativity, productivity, [and] industry" 
seems closer to the heart of virtue ethics. 91 They helpfully note that creativity, 
productivity, and industry can be considered part ofa Maclntyrian "practice. "92 Peer 
production provides additional avenues for individuals to engage in creative and 
productive work, and thus can facilitate valuable practices. 93 
In addition, Benkler and Nissenbaum note that peer production encourages the 
"other-regarding" virtues of "benevolence, charity, generosity, [and] altruism." 94 
Participants in open source communities give time, resources, and talents to the 
project, ordinarily without direct financial remuneration. 95 As Benkler and 
Nissenbaum note, however, the literature concerning open source culture is ambiguous 
concerning whether participants offer their time, resources, and talents for altruistic 
reasons or as part of an essentially self-interested medium of exchange. 96 
Finally, Benkler and Nissenbaum focus on the virtues of"sociability, camaraderie, 
friendship, cooperation[, and] civic virtue." 97 It is here that their link between virtue 
ethics and peer production is perhaps most salient. This cluster of virtues involves 
providing resources to a community engaged in a common project with a common 
goal. The concept is similar, Benkler and Nissenbaum note, to the American founders' 
notion of politics as contribution to the public good. 98 Whatever their psychological 
motives, the multifarious contributors to an open source project provide small inputs 
of time, resources, and talent, which cumulate to a much larger good. 
B. Virtue and Biotechnology as an Environmental and Public Health Community 
If virtue ethics concepts can apply generally to open source production, can they 
apply to biotechnology, and specifically to open source biotechnology? Benkler and 
Nissenbaum argue that the ethical implications of any technology include not only the 
uses to which a purportedly "neutral" technology is put, but also the manner in which 
the technology's architecture and functionality affect those uses. 99 Here they helpfully 
draw on technology and society theorists such as Marshall McLuhan and Lewis 
Mumford. 100 Open source production, Benkler and Nissenbaum suggest, structurally 
incorporates virtues that lead to greater human freedom. Ifwe fail to encourage open 
source production, "[ w ]e might miss the chance to benefit from a distinctive socio-
technical system that promotes not only cultural and intellectual production but 
constitutes a venue for human character development." 101 
In this vein, we can view biotechnology, like the communications networks with 
which Benkler usually is most directly concerned, as another medium of information 
91. Benkler & Nissenbaum, supra note 80, at 406-07. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 407-08. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 408. See also Opderbeck, supra note 78, 192-95 (discussing open source "gift" culture). 
97. Benkler & Nissenbaum, supra note 80, at 408-09. 
98. Id. at 409. 
99. Id. at 410-17. 
100. Id. 
IOI. Id. at 417. 
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exchange. It is tempting to draw direct parallels between computer information 
networks and biotechnology. Computer networks are controlled by computer code, 
such that control over the code equals control over the content delivered across the 
network. 102 A society that values the free exchange of ideas should therefore value an 
open code architecture across such computer information networks. Similarly, one 
could suggest that biological organisms are controlled at least to some extent by 
genetic code, and that those who are able to control genetic code through 
biotechnology will be able to control the organism, including people. The distribution 
of control over genetic code across peer production networks then could represent a 
means of democratizing control over life itself. 
I have previously noted a number of difficulties with this approach. 103 In 
particular, it is not so simple to tease out a "code layer" in a living organism that might 
be amenable to peer production. 104 Although DNA is a type of code, it is far more 
complex than a typical computer program, and the hardware and craft knowledge 
needed to isolate and manipulate genetic code is not widely available. 105 
Nevertheless, there may be a role for open source production in biotechnology at 
the broad level of basic research and large-scale genomic databases and at the level of 
certain enabling technologies. 106 For example, the Cambia "BIOS" initiative and the 
HapMap project represent steps in this direction. And, it is at this level of basic 
"upstream" research that fears of a biotechnology anticommons are most tractable. 
The deadweight loss of patent protection in this arena can represent significant human 
suffering. 
The debates about biotechnology patents, then, are essentially debates about 
information-code-that concerns public health. We are concerned about access to 
biotechnology and biotechnology innovation because of the immense promise and 
perils of this technology as it relates to human health. Biotechnology could hold the 
key to a cure for AIDS or the safe disposal of the world's toxic waste. It also could 
generate vast waves of environmental and social disruption, for example, if non-fertile 
genetically modified crops hybridize with indigenous food supplies and render them 
sterile. 
In this regard, it should be clear that, from a virtue ethics perspective, it is not 
enough to treat biotechnology as simply a product in a market. Although the products 
of biotechnology practice can be commodified and traded in markets, and although 
such markets can be an important component in biotechnology policy, markets are not 
the raison d'etre of biotechnology. 
Biotechnology, then, is more than a set of products; it is a Maclntyrian practice 
that seeks to improve human health and wellbeing. In his keynote address at BIO's 
2005 annual convention, BIO President and CEO James Greenwood told the conferees, 
"[Y]ou serve every man, woman and child on earth. And even more impressively, you 
I 02. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (I 999); Wiki Home, 
http://codebook.jot.com/WikiHome (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (the Wiki version of Lessig's CODE AND 
OTHER LAWS is a moderated open source project that will produce "version 2.0" ofLessig's classic text). 
103. See Opderbeck, supra note 78, at 182-85. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 195-97. 
106. See id. at 218. 
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serve the uncountable billions of humans who will inhabit this planet after we are 
gone." 107 Greenwood expressed the biotechnology community's vision, hyperbolicaJJy 
but no doubt sincerely, as follows: 
The convergence of systems biology, genomics, infomatics, proteomics, 
nanotechnology and personalized medicine bring us to the threshold of a new era: 
In the biotech century, using genetically enhanced crops, we will better feed an 
increasingly hungry world. 
In the biotech century, we will harness enzymes to convert plant waste to fuel and to 
biodegradable plastics, reducing our dependence on oil. 
In the biotech century, we will be able to outpace the tortures of[D]arwinian natural 
selection and its afflictions of disease. 
There is no more noble-and no more heroic-mission than this. 108 
Greenwood's sentiments are echoed--even amplified-in a promotional video 
produced by BIO entitled "Biotechnology: Knowledge Serving Life." 109 The video 
adopts the elegiac tone ofa science museum film or public television documentary and 
intercuts brief comments from cancer and cystic fibrosis patients, optimistic and 
earnest talking-head scientists projected against CS I-like blue-tinted backgrounds filled 
with wiggling microorganisms, and colorful images of Midwestern farms and Asian 
village weJls. The narration borders on messianic. At the video's close, the narrator 
teJJs us: 
Dreams begin with inspiration and flourish with determination and courage. Such are 
the dreams of today's biotechnology leaders. Their dream of improving the human 
condition offers hope to those who suffer, relief to those who are ill, and fullness of 
life to those we love. Within our reach is a future unimaginable a generation ago. 
Think of a world where starvation is replaced with healthful diets, where 
manufacturing products and energy are made with natural renewable resources, 
where our environment is preserved for tomorrow's generations. Biotechnology: 
furthered by faithfully exploring the unknown and boldly embracing the possible. 
The world's great new frontier is upon us. 110 
The video includes similar teleological comments from industry leaders. For example, 
Dr. Leroy Hood, President of the Institute for Systems Biology, says: 
If the mission of man is to make suffering less, if the mission of man is to deal with 
hunger and starvation, and if the mission of man is to educate and to better the 
population, I would argue that the kinds of technologies that we're talking about here 
are going to be utterly key in the future for doing that. 111 
Likewise, Robert Beach, Ph.D., President of the Donald Danforth Plant Science 
Center, says: 
107. Hon. James C. Greenwood, Biotechnology Industry Organization 2005 Keynote Speech (Jun. 20, 
2005), http://www.bio.org/events/2005/media/greenwood.asp. 
108. Id. 
109. Biotechnology Industry Organization, Biotechnology: Knowledge Serving Life, 
http://www.bio.org/news/video/greatnewfrontier.asx (last visited Jan. 29, 2007). 
110. Id. 
ll I. Id. 
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I'm terribly optimistic of the science. If we do it all right, we will make a better 
world, a world that is cleaner in its environment, a world that uses less agricultural 
chemicals and that we really can pull this all together through integration of genetics 
and engineering and agriculture and manufacturing and politics and policy, and it all 
is gonna work. 112 
Of course, these are public relations pieces as much as they are true reflections of 
sentiments in the biotechnology community, and one might be permitted a bit of 
cynicism about the motivation of altruism versus motivation derived from the prospect 
of cashing out stock options in a buy-out or public offering. These sentiments do, 
however, reflect a genuine sense of purpose in the biotechnology community, however 
attenuated or pinched il might be at times by other priorities. That reai sense of 
purpose can form the basis of practices that extend the biotechnology narrative towards 
the ultimate goal of human flourishing. 113 
Because of this linkage with healthcare and the environment, it is useful to 
examine how virtue ethics relates to those fields. Fortunately, virtue ethics concepts 
are well-developed both in relation to health care and the environment. In the next 
sections, I will sketch some relevant virtue ethics perspectives on heath care and 
environmental issues. I will then offer some suggestions for how those perspectives 
could relate to biotechnology intellectual property policy. 
1. Environmental Virtue Ethics 
There are at least four broad approaches to environmental virtue ethics. First, a 
policy or action can be evaluated as an extension of basic interpersonal virtues. 114 
Interpersonal virtues are those that concern relationships among humans. 115 These 
include virtues such as honesty, temperance, gratitude, and generosity. 116 Such virtues 
can be extended to relationships between humans and nonhuman animals or the natural 
environment, assuming there is some ground for holding such relationships 
commensurable. 117 The virtue of gratitude, say, might apply in relation to the way in 
which one benefits from the natural environment, just as it applies to benefits one 
receives from other people. 118 
A second strategy for environmental virtue ethics focuses on agent benefit. 119 
Here the relevant question is how the virtue in question benefits its possessor. 120 Under 
this approach, concern for the natural environment is a virtue because a clean 
112. Id. 
113. Of course, the biotechnology community itself cannot answer the question of why human 
flourishing should provide the overarching framework for this particular community's goals and practices. 
That broader question can only be answered by theology, philosophy, and other metaphysical disciplines. 
(My thanks to Brad Kallenberg for mentioning this important qualifier.) 
114. Ronald Sandler, Introduction: Environmental Virtue Ethics, in ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE ETHICS 
I, 4 (Ronald Sandler & Philip Cafaro eds., 2005). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
I 18. Id. 
119.Id. 
120. Id. 
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environment is conducive to the actor's health and to the enjoyment of natural 
resources. 121 Such enjoyment includes not only the use of things like clean air and 
water, but also the aesthetic experience of unpolluted spaces. 122 
Another approach is to study the character of environmental role models. 123 Such 
role models provide examples of character traits comprising environmental virtue. 
Telling the stories of such role models inculcates those virtues in the life of the 
community. 124 
Finally, environmental virtue can be grounded in concepts ofhuman excellence. 125 
Under this framework, a virtue is something that enables human beings to flourish. 
The virtues of generosity and charity, for example, enable individuals to contribute to 
the social groups to which they belong, and thereby enhance individual well-being. 126 
2. Virtue Ethics and Health Care 
Virtue ethics as applied to health care primarily focuses on the character traits of 
a virtuous practitioner given the ends of medical practice. 127 For example, Justin 
Oakley and Dean Cocking have suggested that a doctor's role must be defined in 
regard to the teleology of medical practice, which is the promotion ofhuman health. 128 
An "ethical" doctor is one who possesses the character traits or virtues that support this 
practice. 129 Oakley and Cocking identify these virtues as beneficence, truthfulness, 
trustworthiness, courage, and humility. 130 A physician who possesses these virtues will 
put the patient's needs above herown, provide patients with accurate information, keep 
patient confidences and respect patient autonomy, seek the patient's good despite 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 5. 
124. This represents a form of the virtue ethic found in the "heroic" societies discussed by Macintyre. 
See MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 121-30. Macintyre suggests that 
perhaps what we have to learn from heroic societies is twofold: first that all morality is 
always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular and that the aspirations of the 
morality of modernity to a universality freed from all particularity is an illusion; and 
secondly that there is no way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we 
inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of predecessors in which series 
heroic societies hold first place. 
Id. at 126-27. 
125. Sandler, supra note 114, at 5. 
126. See id. 
127. See, e.g., JUSTIN OAKLEY & DEAN COCKING, VIRTUE ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ROLES (200 I); 
Ann Marie Begley, Practising Virtue: A Challenge to the View that a Virtue Centered Approach to Ethics 
Lacks Practical Content, 12 NURSING ETHICS 622 (2005); P. Gardiner, A Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral 
Dilemmas in Medicine, 29 J. MED. 297 (2003). 
128. OAKLEY&C0CKING,supranote 127, at74-85. 
129. Id. at 92. 
130. Id. at 92-93. Beneficence is "a disposition to focus on the patient's own psychophysical needs, and 
to distinguish which procedures are genuinely necessary for the patient's health and which would be 
excessive (and so to avoid 'defensive medicine'), and to desire the removal of the patient's impairment, for 
the patient's own sake, along with a sensitivity and tactfulness in dealing with the vulnerabilities common 
to sick people." Id. at 92-93. 
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personal risks, and recognize when it is necessary to call upon the expertise of other 
practitioners. 131 
Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma have developed a virtue ethics approach 
to medical practice and health care policy 132 in response to the principle-based model 
that has largely dominated medical ethics since the first publication of Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress' Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 133 Beauchamp and 
Childress' approach centers on four core principles-respect for autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice-from which particular rules can be 
derived. 134 Beauchamp and Childress view virtues and character as adjuncts that 
enhance or round out an assessment of conduct based on principles and rules. 135 
However, they consider acts that go beyond what is strictly required by principles and 
rules as supererogatory and not morally required. 136 Thus, although Beauchamp and 
Childress attend to the virtues, their ethic remains Kantian and deontological. 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, in contrast, recognize the importance of principles and 
rules, but accord priority to virtue. 137 In their view, a virtuous person is not a person 
who merely observes a principle, but one for whom the principle is "synonymous with 
her intentions with respect to other humans, [ and who] is habitually disposed to respect 
that principle, and is disposed to do so excellently-that is, as fully as possible." 138 For 
the virtuous person, a principle is not merely a Kantian duty, but is "incised, so as to 
speak, in the etymological sense of the word 'character,' into her very person and 
identity." 139 
Pellegrino and Thomasma also depart from the deontological approach in where 
they locate the source of virtue. The source of virtue is not obedience to principles per 
se, but is located in the ends or purposes of the physician-patient relationship. 140 This 
reflects the communitarian and teleological nature of virtue ethics. 141 In order to 
determine what a virtuous practitioner looks like, one must first understand the ends 
of medicine, which include the restoration of health and the alleviation of pain and 
discomfort. 142 
With these concepts in view-virtue as primary, and the location of the virtues in 
the teleology of the community of practice-Pellegrino and Thomasma define a 
number of cardinal virtues in medical practice. These include fidelity to the trust a 
patient places in a physician, justice, fortitude, compassion, temperance, integrity, and 
self effacement. 143 All of these virtues are anchored by practical wisdom or 
131. Id. 
132. PELLEGRINO & TuOMASMA, supra note 40. 
133. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2001 ). 
134. Id. at 12-14. 
135. Id. at 26-39. 
136. Id. at 39-51. 
137. PELLEGRINO & TuOMASMA, supra note 40, at 20-29. 
138. Id. at 22. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 52. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 52-53. 
143. Id. at 65-161. 
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phronesis. 144 A physician in whom such virtues have become ingrained will tend to 
observe Beauchamp and Childress's four principles, but will also extend and go 
beyond those principles towards a more holistic relationship to her patients and 
participation in the medical community. 
C. Applications of Open Source, Environmental, and Health Care 
Virtue Ethics to Biotechnology 
Against this background of how virtue ethics has been applied to open source 
communities, environmental problems, and health care, it is possible to identify several 
themes that can support a virtue ethics approach to open source biotechnology. 
First, biotechnology is part of a broader community of science. We should ask, 
''what characteristics are embodied in the biotechnology community that, if developed, 
will enable it to function as an excellent scientific/public health community?" The 
communitarian focus of virtue ethics maps well onto the ideal of biotechnology 
research as a community of science. The communitarian focus also encourages us to 
think about what sort of community we want the biotechnology community to become. 
As we consider biotechnology as a community, we can focus on the practices that 
support the virtues integral to that community. Here, the concepts of"internal goods," 
"standards of excellence," and "systematic extension" are inherent both in communities 
of science as well as in open source communities. The environmental virtue ethics 
concept of "agent benefit" also meshes well with this teleological, practice-oriented 
view of biotechnology. The biotechnology practitioner seeks ways to produce 
healthier, more abundant crops, or to eliminate the polluting by-products of farm or 
industrial activities. 145 The extension of these practices moves the community closer 
to its te/os. 
Likewise, the health care virtue ethics concept of the virtuous practitioner applies 
to those engaged in the practice of biotechnology. The virtues identified by Oakley 
and Cocking in reference to medical doctors can apply to biotechnology researchers, 
although with a different focus. While the question whether a medical doctor is a 
beneficent, truthful and trustworthy practitioner is defined largely in relation to the 
patient, the biotechnology researcher is defined in relation to the scientific research 
community and the public. A truthful and trustworthy researcher, for example, will 
144. Id. at 84-91. 
145. As BIO, the biotechnology industry's leading trade group, notes, "[w]hen people are asked what 
they think of when they hear the word biotechnology, they respond with phrases like 'biomedical research,' 
'breakthrough medicines,' 'cures' and 'hope for the future.' Health care is, after all, the number one market 
for biotechnology." Biotechnology Industry Organization, Health Care/Overview, http://www.bio.org/ 
healthcare (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). Concerning agriculture, BIO states that "[t]oday biotech plant 
products offer growers the ability to reduce pesticide use, minimize soil erosion, optimize land use and 
reduce cancer-causing fungal compounds (mycotoxins) in grains. Products are now in development with 
nutritional benefits for consumers." Biotechnology Industry Organization, State Policy Priorities for 
Agricultural Biotechnology, http://www.bio.org/foodag/positions/agribio.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
Concerning industrial pollution, BIO states that "industrial biotechnology is facilitating a new industrial 
revolution that can bring a cleaner future with better products at lower cost." Biotechnology Industry 
Organization Press Release, Report Finds Industrial Biotechnology is Sparking a New and Cleaner 
Industrial Revolution (June 3, 2004), http://www.bio.org/news/newsitem.asp?id=2004_0603_01. 
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provide an accurate report ofher results, and a beneficent researcher will place the goal 
of fostering beneficial scientific knowledge above other strategic or personal concerns. 
Similarly, Pellegrino and Thomasma's concepts of fidelity to trust and self-
effacement apply directly to biotechnology research. As they note, when a researcher 
accepts public funds and benefits from public facilities and research-conducive social 
arrangements, the researcher enters into a "covenant with society in which the primary 
goods cannot be power, personal profit, prestige, or pride." 146 Such financial and 
reputational rewards are "external" to the practice of research and ought not to 
dominate the internal goods such as increasing knowledge and developing useful 
technology. 147 Moreover, because the research community depends on access to the 
research of others, a virtuous researcher must be able to balance legitimate self-interest 
with an understanding that her results should be accessible to others. 148 Pellegrino and 
Thomasma particularly criticize the "industrial model" of research. As they note, 
"[g]aining the competitive edge, establishing priority and ownership of information, 
cornering the market, getting the patent, choosing research topics on their future 
investment possibilities-these are the values of industry. They encourage the wrong 
kind of self-interest and frustrate the primary aim ofresearch." 149 A practice such as 
open access publishing, which embodies an open source ethos, is particularly valuable 
because it builds on the internal goods of the biotechnology community. 150 
In addition, the virtue of justice can play an important role in a virtue ethics 
approach to biotechnology. Justice as a virtue is "the strict habit ofrendering what is 
due to others." 151 Justice includes the principle of beneficence and the virtue of 
benevolence, as well as a commitment to socialjustice. 152 Pellegrino and Thomasma 
identify "skimming and dumping"-the practice of treating only the best paying 
patients and not treating the poor-as examples of poor policies that virtuous 
practitioners should strive to avoid. 153 Similar concerns apply to the biotechnology 
research community, particularly concerning the allocation ofresearch support. 
Finally, all these virtues must be anchored by the core virtue of phronesis or 
practical wisdom. In this regard, it is important to remember that market-based and 
open source production methods are not necessarily at odds. When transaction costs 
are low, markets might often distribute biotechnology resources more efficiently than 
other methods, and intellectual property rights might facilitate efficient exchanges. 154 
In the quote that opens this essay, the Biotechnology Industry Organization states that 
"[i]ntellectual property protection is the key factor for economic growth and 
146. PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 40, at 135. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 136-37. 
149. Id. at 136. 
150. For a detailed discussion of the political economy ofopen access publishing models, including the 
political difficulties they face, see David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Paradox: The Political Economy 
of International Intellectual Property and the Paradox of Open Intellectual Property Models, I 8 ST AN. 
L. & PoL'Y REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id 
=927261. 
151. PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 40, at 92. 
152. Id. at 94-98. 
153. Id. at 98. 
154. See Opderbeck, supra note 78, at 218-223. 
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advancement in the biotechnology sector." 155 It is too simplistic to assert that this 
reflects mere greed. There is an element of virtue in this statement, as it reflects a 
measure of practical wisdom gained as the biotechnology community has extended its 
practices over time. And yet, if BIO's recent promotional video is correct, and the 
biotechnology's core teleology is to "make suffering less ... deal with hunger and 
starvation, and ... educate and to better the population," 156 economic growth and 
advancement do not exist in a vacuum. Economic growth and advancement in the 
biotechnology sector advance a broader purpose. At times, that broader purpose might 
better be extended through practices that focus on results other than economic growth. 
These core virtues of beneficence, fidelity to trust, justice, and practical wisdom 
cohere nicely with the set of virtues required for excellence in open source production. 
If such virtues can become foundational to the discussion ofbiotechnology intellectual 
property policy, open science alternatives could be viewed not as potential adjuncts in 
cases of market failure, nor as a socialistic utopian panacea, but rather as a set of 
practices that can contribute to the eudemonia toward which biotechnology strives. 
Open source communities can then provide a third way between outright dedication to 
the public domain and restrictive patenting and licensing policies. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The debate over intellectual property policy concerning biotechnology seems 
intractable. Instrumentalists dicker about how to tweak the incentives in order to 
produce the best mix of innovation and disclosure, without stepping back to ask 
whether the consequentialist approach is best on a broad scale. Hegelians seem to have 
little to say about biotechnology, given that researchers seem to bear little resemblance 
to the artists and poets who most obviously pour their personalities into their work. 
Postmodern critics offer some trenchant critiques of the current system, but suggest few 
alternatives that could be realized in contemporary biotechnology. 
Perhaps the biotechnology "thicket" has as much to do with these conflicting 
underlying philosophies ofintellectual property as it does with individual patent rights 
that must be cleared to conduct research in this field. Virtue ethics may illuminate a 
path forward. By recognizing that biotechnology is a community dedicated to human 
flourishing, and focusing on the practices that move that community ever towards its 
goal, the assumptions and language we use to describe biotechnology intellectual 
property policy may begin to change. Change will not come rapidly or dramatically, 
given the political interests involved. 157 But if the ethical dialogue begins to change, 
efforts to change policy should gain more traction. The time is right for a new vision 
of intellectual property grounded in the ancient virtues. 
155. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra note I 02 and accompanying text. 
I 5 7. For a discussion of the political economy ofopen intellectual property models, biotechnology, and 
international intellectual property law, see Opderbeck, supra note 150. 
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